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"The power of speech has the same effect on the condition of the soul as the 
application of drugs to the state of bodies, for just as different drugs dispel 
different fluids from the body, and some bring an end to disease but others 
end life, so also some speeches cause pain, some pleasure, some fear; some 
instill courage, some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persua-
sion."' 
Gorgias (483- 375 BC) 
INTRODUCTION 
It has long been in vogue to discredit the judiciary.2 From the early 
days of legal realism, the concept of the "impartial" judge has been repeat-
1. READINGS FROM CLASSICAL RHETORIC, 34, 35 (Patricia P. Matsen, Philip Rollin-
son & Marion Sousa eds., 1990) (quoting the Greek philosopher Gorgias ). 
2. See, e.g., Alex B. Long, "Stop Me Before I Vote for This Judge Again": Judicial 
Conduct Organizations, Judicial Accountability, and the Disciplining of Elected Judges, 106 
W.VA. L. REv. I, 48 (2003). Long argues that judicial independence and accountability is a 
modern reaction against judicial misconduct, which is made even more obscene by the poor-
ly written judicial opinions against judges accused of judicial misconduct. This distrust can 
be traced as far back as colonial American times given that "the framers of the United States 
Constitution provided for only one explicit method of disciplining federal judges-
impeachment." /d. at 17; see also Martin H. Redish, Taking a Stroll Through Jurassic Park: 
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edly scoffed at by those initiated in modern theories of jurisprudence.3 Ever 
more convincing studies into the pervasive nature of cognitive biases,4 
among other disheartening studies, have further eroded our faith in the abil-
ity of human nature to transcend itself to faithfully mete out that most elu-
sive of concepts-justice.5 
Yet, the judiciary remains the most trusted of the three branches of 
govemment.6 Though imperfect, the public does generally trust and respect 
the judiciary.7 And, if we are honest with ourselves, so do the majority of 
Americans (lawyers and even academics) because judges are perceived as 
Neutral Principles and the Originalist-Minimalist Fallacy in Constitutional Interpretation, 
88 Nw. U. L. REV. 165, 165-66 ( 1993) (The basic premise of the article is that judicial consti-
tutional interpretation is the first line of defense against the "unrepresentative judicial 'phi-
losopher-kings,' [which] surely threatens the values of self-determination, accountability and 
representationalism that provide core notions of American political theory."). 
3. Scott B. Gitterman, Taking on Big Money: How Caperton Will Change Judicial 
Disqualification Forever, 35 NOVA L. REV. 475, 498 (2011); Gabriel D. Serbulea, Due Pro-
cess and Judicial Disqualification: The Needfor Reform, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1109, 1143 (2011) 
("The fifth and most important tenet, judge impartiality, is not consistent with the self-
judging of recusal motions, which is the law in most states and the federal system, and find-
ing an impartial appellate judge for an interlocutory appeal places a heavy burden on liti-
gants. In fact, it is so ingrained in our judiciary that the challenged judge should pass upon a 
recusal motion that Chief Justice Rehnquist rebuked Senators Patrick Leahy and Joe Lieber-
man for questioning Justice Scalia in Cheney while the case was pending."); see Republican 
Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 798 (2002) ("There is a critical difference between the 
work of the judge and the work of other public officials. In a democracy, issues of policy are 
properly decided by majority vote; it is the business of legislators and executives to be popu-
lar. But in litigation, issues of law or fact should not be determined by popular vote; it is the 
business of judges to be indifferent to unpopularity."). 
4. Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who's Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 
MINN. L. REv. 1997,2005 (2010) (describing judges' "paradigmatic status," which has been 
understood to require "the separation of legal reason from emotion"); Dan Simon, A Psycho-
logical Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. I, 39-41 (1998). 
5. Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 
CALIF. L. REV. 629, 630 (2011) (defining "judicial dispassion" synonymously with "emotion-
less judging"). 
6. Adam Liptak, Sunday Dialogue: Putting the Justices on TV, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
10, 20 II, http://www.nytimes.com/20 11/12/11 /opinion/sunday/sunday-dialogue-putting-the-
justices-on-tv.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all?src=tp; see THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (It is the judiciary's duty "to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the 
Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would 
amount to nothing." Hamilton warned that courts exercising executive or legislative powers 
would amount to judicial tyranny; but he believed that only the judiciary could be trusted to 
hold the other branches to the prescribed limits of their authority.). 
7. Liptak, supra note 6; Nancy S. Marder, Letter to the Editor, Invitation to a Dia-
logue: Cameras in the Court?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/20 II /12/07 /opinionlinvitation-to-a-dialogue-cameras-in-the-
supreme-court.html ?scp= I &sq=cameras%20in%20the%20court&st=cse. 
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the least corrupt product of our political system.8 Held to the standards of 
Judicial Codes of Conduct,9 sheathed in the mystery of the law, by dint of 
their education, experience, age, and public reputation, the judiciary has 
remained mostly removed from the scorn of the public and generally untar-
nished from the dirt and mudslinging of the public square. 
It still takes some guts to impugn the integrity of a judge. Or, at least, 
it used to. Since Bush v. Gore, 10 however, even the Supreme Court has in-
creasingly been subject to the new accepted truth of the political judge. 11 It 
no longer even raises eyebrows to refer to the "conservative" or the "liber-
al" Justices in the prediction of judicial decisions. 12 Those predictions are 
presumptively based on the political ideology of the judge, and not on some 
accepted version of truth or even simply deferral to ideals of the law some-
where beyond partisanship. 
Recently, however, even that subjective ideological characterization is 
increasingly turning into a darker and greatly more troubling conceptualiza-
tion. The new sense is that judges, particularly those coming out of the judi-
cial election process, are bought and paid for. 13 If not with direct bribes, 
8. Americans Trust Judiciary Branch Most, Legislative Least, GALLUP POLITICS 
(Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/video/122894/ Americans-Trust-Judicial-Branch-
Legislative-Least.aspx ("More than three in four Americans (76%) say they have a great deal 
or fair amount of trust and confidence in the government's judicial branch, compared with 
61% who trust the executive branch and 45% who trust the legislative branch."); see also 
Frank Newport, Trust in Legislative Branch Falls to Record-Low 36%, GALLUP POLITICS 
(Sept. 24, 20 I 0), http:/ /www.gallup.com/poll/143225/Trust-Legislative-Branch-Falls-
Record-Low.aspx; Maroney, supra note 5, at 636. 
9. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2010). 
10. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see Margaret Tarkington, A Free Speech Right to Impugn 
Judicial Integrity in Court Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. REV. 363,364-65 (2010) ("The scholarly 
literature generally supports the denial of First Amendment protection in such cases, indicat-
ing that attorney speech-when made in court proceedings-is entitled to little, if any, con-
stitutional protection. Indeed, in its 1991 plurality opinion, Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, a 
majority of the U.S. Supreme Court stated in dicta: 'It is unquestionable that in the court-
room itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to "free speech" an attorney has is 
extremely circumscribed."'). 
11. See Stephanie Condon, Elena Kagan: Four Potential Corifirmation Hurdles, 
CBS NEWS (May 10, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20004539-
503544.html; Dylan Loewe, The Politics of Sotomayor, HUFFINGTON POST (May 26, 2009), 
http:/ /www.huffingtonpost.com/dylan-loewe/the-politics-of-sotomayor _ b _ 207617 .html 
("Will nominating the first Hispanic justice to the high court further Obama's courtship of 
the Hispanic community? It certainly can't hurt, though it's hard to imagine that it alone will 
do the job. But Obama may stand to gain more, not from corralling a majority of Democrats 
to vote in favor of Sotomayor, but from inspiring the most virulent elements of the Republi-
can Party to oppose her."). 
12. See Supreme Court, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/4732/Supreme-
Court.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
13. ADAM SKAGGS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, BUYING JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF 
CITIZENS UNITED ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, 4-7 (2010), available at 
http://www. brennancenter.org/page/-/publications/BCReportBuyingJustice. pdf?nocdn= l 
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judicial decisions are bought through the corrosive process of political cam-
paign donations. 14 Justice is for sale. 
Empirical evidence supports the conclusion that judicial campaign do-
nations do appear to affect judicial decision making. 15 Results are apparently 
exacerbated by contentious political judicial races. 16 Moreover, there is clear 
evidence that the public perception of the corrosive effects of campaign 
contributions is endemic. 17 And that was before Citizens United. 18 
For the judiciary, the reality of a Citizens United worldview of cam-
paign speech and the regulation of the judiciary has only begun to be felt or 
really examined in the context of the judicial election paradigm. 19 It creates 
the reality of a fundamental clash of principles-the "guiding principle" of 
freedom, the primacy of the unfettered exchange of ideas-with the "guid-
ing principle" of justice, the idea of blind Lady Justice herself, embodied in 
[hereinafter BUYING JUSTICE] (collecting survey data on national and state level data demon-
strating that Americans believe, by significant margins, that campaign spending has an im-
pact on judicial decision-making). 
14. ADAM SKAGGS ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS: 2009-10, 20-
22 (2011), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/23b60118bc49d599bd_35m6yyon3.pdf [here-
inafter NEW POLITICS]. 
15. Solid Bipartisan Majorities Believe Judges Influenced by Campaign Contribu-
tions, JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN (Sept. 8, 201 0), 
http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroorn/press _releases.cfm/981 0 _solid_ bipartisan_ majoritie 
s _believe judges _influenced_ by_ campaign_ contributions?show=news&newsiD=8722 
(among the findings of the survey were the following: "71 percent of Democrats, and 70 
percent of Republicans, believe campaign expenditures have a significant impact on court-
room decisions." Only 23 percent of all voters "believe campaign expenditures have little or 
no influence on elected judges." Moreover, "82 percent of Republicans, and 79 percent of 
Democrats, say a judge should not hear cases involving a campaign supporter who spent 
$10,000 toward his or her election." Finally, "88 percent of Republicans, and 86 percent of 
Democrats, say that 'all campaign expenditures to elect judges' should be publicly disclosed, 
so that voters can know who is seeking to elect each candidate."). 
16. /d. 
17. /d. 
18. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); CHRISTIAN W. 
PECK, ZOGBY lNT'L, ATTITUDES AND VIEWS OF AMERICAN BUSINESS LEADERS ON STATE 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO JUDGES 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/CED _FINAL _repor _ ons_14MA Y07 _BED4DF495 
5BOI.pdf ("Four in five business leaders worry that financial contributions have a major 
influence on decisions rendered by judges. There is near-universal concern among business 
leaders that 'Campaign contributions and political pressure will make judges accountable to 
politicians and special interest groups instead of the law and the Constitution.'"). 
19. See generally Michael C. Dorf, The Constitution and the Political Community, 
27 CONST. COMMENT. 499 (2011). See also Girardeau A. Spann, Constitutional Hypocrisy, 
27 CONST. COMMENT. 557, 571-72 (20 11) ("Judicial review can rationalize the practice of 
illegitimate discrimination by making the culture's oppressive behavior seem as if it flows 
rationally from the equality principle embodied in the Constitution. This, in turn, provides an 
excuse for engaging in cultural practices that would otherwise seem unconstitutionally invid-
ious."). 
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the fragile transcendent concept of the rule of law beyond faction or group. 
Such tension always existed in the defining of the appropriate role of judi-
cial selection, but never before has the Supreme Court pushed freedom of 
speech so far forward and combined it with the freedom to advertise, to 
sway opinion, and to campaign on behalf of the heretofore mostly silent 
judge.20 We are left with the very real question of whether what's left of 
society's belief in the law will be subsumed into a sea of never ending, well-
funded, and vicious chatter. 
This Article will look at the idea of judicial elections and ask the fun-
damental question: Is it possible to maintain an impartial judiciary in the 
wake of Citizens United? In Part I, it will argue that the system as it current-
ly exists and the remedies currently available make little sense in the brave 
new world we now live in. In Part II, it will argue that there are only two 
legitimate societal choices available, accept the entrance of a pervasive, 
increasingly powerful influence on judges and its corollary of ever decreas-
ing faith of the public in judges, or end judicial elections entirely. The Su-
preme Court was quite correct when it said, "campaigning for office is not a 
game."21 It is deadly serious and, I will argue, inherently incompatible with 
the universality required in the belief of the rule oflaw and not men. 
I. ELECTIONS HAVE CONSEQUENCES 
"I have always thought, from my earliest youth till now, that the greatest 
scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and sinning 
people, was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent Judiciary. •>22 
A. The Majoritarian Dilemma 
John Marshall (1830) 
Proceedings and Debates of the 
Virginia State Convention of 1829-1830 
There is attraction to the idea of accountability-that the judge must 
be and should be held up to the majoritarian view and that such majoritarian 
views can best be discerned by the people's choice of candidates among 
20. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (2010) ("No sufficient governmental interest 
justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations."). 
21. Arizona Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 
2826 (2011) ('"Leveling the playing field' can sound like a good thing. But in a democracy, 
campaigning for office is not a game. It is a critically important form of speech. The First 
Amendment embodies our choice as a Nation that, when it comes to such speech, the guiding 
principle is freedom-the 'unfettered interchange of ideas'-not whatever the State may 
view as fair." (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976))). 
22. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 251 (1920) overruled by United States v. Hatter, 
532 U.S. 557 (2001), citing Debates Va. Conv. 1829-1831, pp. 616,619. 
718 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:713 
those on the ballot.23 After all, we are all subject to the law. Hence, the legal 
arbiter, the judge, should be subject to us-by ballot. There is comfort in the 
idea that the people can express their anger at judicial excess by vote, de-
mocracy at work. 
The tradition of empowering the people through electoral rights has a 
storied history in the United States.24 By the mid-nineteenth century, judicial 
elections had become popular as part of the Jacksonian movement toward 
greater control of public office.25 Though the Federalists, embodied by 
Hamilton, had prevailed in having judicial merit appointment be the sole 
selection process for the Federal bench, the Anti-Federalists had persevered 
in the state arena.26 Their concern was that of accountabilityY An independ-
ent judge could "feel themselves independent of heaven itself."28 Thus, the 
appeal of the judicial election is that it keeps the judge firmly in tune with 
the constituency responsible for the selection. 
From its outset, this majoritarian ideal was acknowledged to be in con-
flict with the equally long-standing common law tradition of judicial inde-
pendence.29 To arrive at a workable median, the judicial election process 
was bound by-rules significantly more restrictive than those of its legislative 
or executive counterparts.30 As judicial elections have become more politi-
cized, however, the majoritarian paradigm may be understood to be suc-
cumbing to partisan faction. As Justice O'Connor identified, '"In too many 
states, judicial elections are becoming political prizefights where partisans 
and special interests seek to install judges who will answer to them instead 
of the law and the Constitution. "'31 
The majoritarian ideal itself is fraught with certain dangers not present 
in executive or legislative elections. First, this ideal of judicial accountabil-
ity by election is arguably better understood as a sense of effective popular-
23. Judicial elections remain incredibly popular, given that around eighty percent of 
judicial positions are fulfilled via an election. Charlie Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence in 
the Courts in an Age of Individual Rights and Public Skepticism, in BENCH PRESS: THE 
COLLISION OF COURT, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA 43 (Keith Bybee ed., 2007). 
24. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule 
of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 689, 706-710, 716 (1995); see Republican Party of Minn. v. 
White, 536 U.S. 765, 791 (2002). 
25. Terri Day, Buying Justice: Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Campaign Dollars, Man-
datory Recusal and Due Process, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 359, 363 (2009); Republican Party of 
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 791(2002). 
26. Day, supra note 25, at 364-65. 
27. !d. 
28. /d. at 364. 
29. /d. at 365. 
30. !d. at 363. 
31. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (May 17, 2007) 
http://www. brennancenter.org/content/resource/report _shows_ spread_ of_ special_interest_pr 
essure _growing_ clout_ of_ business. 
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ism than one of actual judicial accountability. The judge, after all, is re-
quired to be neutral. The various Codes of Judicial Conduct-both Model 
(MR) and enacted-are rife with admonitions requiring impartiality.32 Some 
examples include MR 2.4(a), "A judge shall not be swayed by public clam-
or or fear of criticism," and MR 2.3(a), "A judge shall perform the duties of 
judicial office ... without bias or prejudice."33 
Similarly, a judge's failure to conduct herself impartially is the near 
universal standard for requiring judicial recusal.34 For example, MR 2.11(a): 
"A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned."35 This includes specif-
ic admonitions for recusal when, for example, "[t]he judge, while a judge or 
a judicial candidate, has made a public statement, other than in a court pro-
ceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to commit 
the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way in the pro-
ceeding or controversy."36 
For these reasons, judges do not and cannot be understood as appro-
priately being able to represent a certain political constituency. It is simply 
not within the purported role of the judge in his judicial office to act in a 
way that is representative of even a majoritarian consensus, if that consen-
sus is beyond the requirements of the law.37 Thus, judicial accountability is 
at best properly restricted to inappropriate role behavior in a judge's appli-
cation ofthe law. Yet, as stated above, the Codes of Conduct and other reg-
ulatory apparatuses of the judiciary already prohibit such behavior.38 Given 
that judicial elections occur primarily at the state court level and predomi-
nantly at the trial level of those states, the implication that election is a 
proper method of accountability is simply a form of popularist enforcement 
of social norms. 39 
Even assuming the public is truly capable of understanding the judicial 
role, elections have always had a very uncomfortable fit with the idea of 
32. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (2010). ADMIN. OFF. OF 
U.S. CTS., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.uscourts.govNiewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02A-
Ch02.pdf. 
33. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 2.3(a) & 2.4(a) (201 0). 
34. See id. R. 2.11. 
35. !d. Canon 2.ll(a). 
36. !d. Canon 2.11 (a)(5). 
37. See id. Canon 1 ("A judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, 
and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropri-
ety."); see also id. pmbl. ("[T]he judiciary plays a central role in preserving the principles of 
justice and the rule of law. Inherent in all the Rules contained in this Code are the precepts 
that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a 
public trust and strive to maintain and enhance confidence in the legal system."). 
38. See id. Canon 1. 
39. BUYINGJUSTICE,supranote 13,at 11-12. 
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judicial selection or retention.40 Popularism, or even majoritarianism, has 
never been consistent with the judicial function, much of which exists in the 
application oflaws exists to protect the rights of the inherently unpopular.41 
Majoritarian arguments in favor of judicial elections combined with 
the unfettered ability of interested parties to advertise can only enhance the 
populist effect of judicial elections.42 Or, perhaps more perniciously, they 
increase the risks that an effective call to populist elements by interested 
parties-political or otherwise-will overwhelm the objectivity which ef-
fective judicial elections require. Majoritarian arguments for judicial elec-
tions in a post Citizens United world force a very high rationality burden on 
the public and an even higher burden of judicial probity of the judge subject 
to election by such a system. 
Effectively, it rests on a very problematic basic assumption that as 
elections get louder and noisier and hence more costly, the effect of cam-
paign contributions or funded advertising will be subsumed within that of 
adherence to the true majoritarian position, if such can even be correctly 
perceived by the much put upon political judge.43 Accountability will be 
effectuated by the judge hearing the public and comporting herself in ac-
cordance with that expression, within the bounds of her proper role. If that 
does not occur, the advertiser can inform the public of such failing and hope 
the next judge elected will be more compliant. 
There is little evidence to suggest, however, that whoever is funding 
informational campaign ads in a judicial election would do so out of any-
thing other than their own particular interest.44 There is no requirement that 
such advertisements be for a public educational purpose and, if legislative 
electoral ads are any basis for speculation, advertisements in the judicial 
40. See Merit Selection Should Apply to All Superior Court Judges, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUSTICE (May 18, 2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/elert/merit_selection 
_should_apply_to_all_superior_courtjudges/; see New Call for Merit Selection of Judges, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/elert/ 
new_ call _for_ merit_ selection_ of judges. 
41. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 798 (2002) ("Sir Matthew 
Hale pointedly described this essential attribute of the judicial office in words which have 
retained their integrity for centuries: 'II. That popular or court applause or distaste have no 
influence in anything I do, in point of distribution of justice. 12. Not to be solicitous what 
men will say or think, so long as I keep myself exactly according to the rule of justice."' 
(quoting 2 J. CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND 208 (1873) (citations omit-
ted))). 
42. See generally Croley, supra note 24, at 713-28. 
43. See id. at 714-15. 
44. NEW POLITICS, supra note 14, at 5 ("The money amassed by a few groups under-
scores an important reality about the politics of judicial elections .... Presently, a few super 
spenders can dominate judicial election funding with an ease unparalleled in campaigns for 
other offices. And loopholes in disclosure laws give them numerous options for doing so in 
substantial secrecy."). 
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context will be just as particular and reflective of the funder's, not the pub-
lic's, interest. There is also not a true countervailing source of advertising to 
support the basic idea of neutrality or objectivity.45 The most basic of public 
choice analysis would predict that the rational judicial candidate will seek to 
adopt at the margins behaviors most likely to assure her reelection. We are 
likely to have a market failure in advertising supporting rational choice and 
moderation. 
In the wake of Citizens United, the fear in the judicial election context 
is not that the judge will fail to hear the expressed opinion of those voting 
and not be accountable to them. The fear in the judicial electoral context is 
that the principle that "Elections have Consequences"46 will become all too 
true. 
B. The Influence-Corruption Spectrum 
"The abuse of buying and selling votes crept in and money began to play an 
important part in determining elections. Later on, this process of corruption 
spread to the law courts and then to the army. And finally, the Republic was 
subjected to the rule of emperors. "41 
Plutarch (46- 120 AD) 
The fact that speech can influence elections and elected officials has 
not been lost on Western civilization. It was, after all, the Ancient Greeks 
who raised rhetoric to a science and enshrined it in the canon of liberal 
arts.48 Nor, despite many allusions to the contrary, was that power ignored 
by the Supreme Court in crafting its decision in Citizens United. The Court 
simply found that "[t]he fact that speakers may have influence over or ac-
cess to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt."49 
45. Id. at 13 ("As in prior years, non-candidate groups played the attack-dog role, 
sponsoring a disproportionate number of negative ads while candidates continued to run 
predominantly positive, traditionally themed advertisements. Though many of the non-
candidate ads were funded by 'tort reform' groups concerned with civil justice issues, the 
vast majority of these ads focused on criminal justice themes, often involving misleading 
claims that judicial candidates were soft on crime."). 
46. Sen. Bernie Sanders, Elections Have Consequences, HUFFINGTON PosT POLITICS 
(July 14, 2011, 7:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-bernie-sanders/elections-have-
consequenc _ b _ 8993 78.htrnl. 
47. Transcript of Justice at Stake: Is Campaign Money Corrupting Our Courts? 
(PBS television broadcast Feb. 19. 2010), http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/02192010/ 
transcript4.html. 
48. JANET M. ATWILL, RHETORIC RECLAIMED: ARISTOTLE AND THE LIBERAL ARTS 
TRADITION 2-3 (1998). 
49. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Cornm'n., 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010} (emphasis 
added). 
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It is that distinction, the ability to influence a judge or for a speaker's 
point to be favored by a judge as somehow distinct from a conclusion that 
the judge is corrupted, that is the crux of the difficulty in applying Citizens 
United to the judicial election context. 5° After all, a judge is not only re-
quired not to be corrupt, but also affirmatively charged with being impartial 
and unbiased. 51 That seeming dissonance is a source of discomfort for many. 
Why is corruption, as opposed to influence or a reduction in impartial-
ity, the standard in Citizens Unitecl? Simply because, for the purpose of 
campaign-expenditures law, the original constitutional decision of Buckley 
v. Valeo made it so.52 That case involved the validity of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1974 (FECA) restrictions on campaign contributions and 
third-party expenditures.53 
It is necessary to begin at Buckley because that Court's holdings set 
the frame for the decision of Citizens United and continues to be the refer-
ence by which the Court reviews limitations of political speech.54 The Court 
made six findings of continuing significance. First, it held that spending 
money on political campaigns, both by direct contribution and through ex-
penditures, was a form of "speech."55 Second, it held that the First Amend-
Id 
50. Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence, in BENCH PRESS, supra note 23, at 85. 
[L ]aw, in order to be a language of dispute management for everyone, appeal[ s] to 
those honestly seeking principled and impartial adjudication as well as to those 
who merely want to drape themselves in the mantle of principled impartiality. Peo-
ple value the ideal of objective reasoning and fair judgment, but they usually re-
main too filled with self-love to live up to this ideal and will seek shortcuts where 
they can. As a result, many individuals will merely dress up their claims and pref-
erences in the formal language of law in the hope that this will allow their cause to 
look better than it actually is. The presence of so many poseurs in the system natu-
rally leads the public to suspect that the judicial process is subject to instrumental 
manipulation. Yet even though such suspicions chip away at judicial legitimacy, 
they also point to the very mechanism that attracts people to judicial dispute man-
agement. It is the possibility of hypocrisy that at once threatens public support for 
the judiciary and makes the courts appealing. 
51. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon I (20 I 0). 
52. 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 ( 1976) (providing that government's interest in providing the 
electorate with information as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is 
spent by the candidate deters actual corruption and avoids the appearance of corruption by 
exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity. Moreover, corruption 
deterrence is of sufficient magnitude to justify intrusion on First Amendment rights resulting 
from Federal Election Campaign Act's disclosure and reporting requirements). 
53. /d. at 6-7, 9, 11-14. 
54. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (providing that under Buckley, "the Govern-
ment may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity. No 
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-
profit corporations"). 
55. /d.at913. 
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ment protected such "speech."56 Third, it held that the relevant and compel-
ling interest was '"in preventing corruption and the appearance of corrup-
tion. "'57 Fourth, it held that the prevention of corruption as a compelling 
interest is somewhat lesser in the campaign expenditure arena than in the 
campaign contribution area. 58 Fifth, it held that independent expenditures by 
third parties lack the "prearrangement and coordination" of campaign con-
tributions. 59 Lastly, it held that restrictions on this funding as speech need to 
be narrowly tailored to serve that governmental interest in preventing cor-
ruption.60 
This last finding, the need to narrowly tailor a restriction on Free 
Speech when that speech is financial and when the compelling government 
interest is preventing electoral corruption, is itself initially puzzling. After 
all, it does seem to allow for the acceptance that something less than official 
"corruption," such as "favoritism" or "influence," is acceptable as an initial 
matter. That was reaffirmed by the following in Citizens United, where the 
Court citing McConnell with approval stated: 
Favoritism and influence are not ... avoidable in representative politics. It is in the 
nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary cor-
ollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support those policies. It is well 
understood that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a 
vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another is that the candi-
date will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors. 
Democracy is premised on responsiveness.61 
56. /d. at 898 ("The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use infor-
mation to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary 
means to protect it. The First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to 
speech uttered during a campaign for political office."' (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic 
Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (citations omitted))). 
57. /d. at 908 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45). "The corporate independent ex-
penditures at issue in this case, however, would not interfere with governmental functions, so 
these cases are inapposite." /d. at 899. 
58. /d. at 901-02 ("The Buckley Court explained that the potential for quid pro quo 
corruption distinguished direct contributions to candidates from independent expenditures. 
The Court emphasized that 'the independent expenditure ceiling ... fails to serve any sub-
stantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the 
electoral process,' ... because '[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination ... allevi-
ates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments 
from the candidate."') (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47-48). 
59. !d. at 902. 
60. !d. at 898 ("[P]olitical speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, 
whether by design or inadvertence. Laws that burden political speech are 'subject to strict 
scrutiny,' which requires the Government to prove that the restriction 'furthers a compelling 
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."' (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. 
Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449,464 (2007))). 
61. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003), overruled by 
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876. 
724 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:713 
"Democracy is premised on responsiveness."62 That is a powerful 
statement, but it begs the question, is responsiveness consonant with jus-
tice? On that, the Court is silent. Their reasoning, however, suggests that 
they are less concerned with the risks of corruptive spending as speech in 
accordance with a majoritarian view of elected governance: 
The appearance of influence or access ... will not cause the electorate to lose faith 
in our democracy .... The fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing 
to spend money to try to persuade voters presupposes that the people have the ul-
timate influence over elected officials.63 
As discussed above in Section LA., the incompatibility of the majori-
tarian view with the judicial function has more than one valid and frequent-
ly articulated set of failings. In fact, the American Bar Association, flawed 
organization though itself may be, is clear in its opposition to judicial elec-
tions as a matter of course.64 They have noted, "If we were writing on a 
clean slate, based on what we now see in how judicial campaigns have 
come to be conducted ... judicial elections would gradually be aban-
doned."65 
The fact that there is a risk of corruption in permitting this kind of 
speech in the electoral process is accepted.66 The Court simply does not find 
it sufficient to support the type of restrictions that were struck down.67 As 
62. !d. 
63. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at910. 
64. ALFRED P. CARLTON, JR., JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY v-vi (2003), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/contentldam/aba!migrated/committees/judind/PublicDocuments/ 
report.authcheckdam.pdf ("The preferred system of state court judicial selection is a com-
mission-based appointive system, with the following components: [I] The governor should 
appoint judges from a pool of judicial aspirants whose qualifications have been reviewed and 
approved by a credible, neutral, nonpartisan, diverse deliberative body or commission. [2] 
Judicial appointees should serve until a specified age. Judges so appointed should not be 
subject to reselection processes, and should be entitled to retirement benefits upon comple-
tion of judicial service. [3] Judges should not otherwise be subject to reselection, nonetheless 
remain subject to regular judicial perfonnance evaluations and disciplinary processes that 
include removal for misconduct."). 
65. !d. at xii ("But we write not on the clean slate but in recognition of the varied 
approaches of the citizens of the 50 states through their Constitutions have dealt and continue 
to deal with the conundrum of judicial selection. We offer recommendations as to changes in 
various existing election methodologies and urge that efforts to improve how judicial elec-
tions are conducted must continue, such as the trend to nonpartisan campaigns and the use of 
public financing mechanisms, in the face of difficulties to eliminate the use of judicial elec-
tions. Any selection system should be accompanied by a sound code of judicial ethics ac-
companied by effective, enforced judicial disciplinary procedures."); Jill E. Moenius, Note, 
Buying Promises: How Citizens United's Campaign Expenditures Convert Our "Impartial" 
Judges and Their Nonpromissory Campaign Statements into an Indebted, Influenced, and 
Dependent Judiciary, 59 U. KAN. L. REv. 1101, 1106 (2011). 
66. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (because there is no quid pro quo). 
67. Id. 
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they stated, "Reliance on a 'generic favoritism or influence theory ... is at 
odds with standard First Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and 
susceptible to no limiting principle. '"68 As we will see in the next Part, how-
ever, empirical evidence studying campaign contributions suggests that par-
tisan elections themselves may be the source of financial speech's corrup-
tive influence. 
II. THE POWER OF MONEY 
"What has been is what will be, and what has been done is what will be 
done; and there is nothing new under the sun. " 
Ecclesiastes 1 :9 
A. Campaign Contributions Affect Judicial Action 
The fact that judges are subject to a certain amount of influence aris-
ing from the manner by which they reach the bench is intuitively obvious. 
As early as the 1853 Massachusetts State Constitutional Convention, "one 
delegate said of judges: 'They are men, and they are influenced by the 
communities, the societies and the classes in which they live, and the ques-
tion now is, not whether they shall be influenced at all, . . . but from what 
quarter that influence shall come. "'69 
It bas long been accepted that we can no more completely remove the 
human bias of experience from a judge than we can from any other person?0 
68. !d. at 910 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 296 
(2003), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876) ("The appearance of influence or ac-
cess, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy. By definition, 
an independent expenditure is political speech presented to the electorate that is not coordi-
nated with a candidate. The fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend 
money to try to persuade voters presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over 
elected officials. This is inconsistent with any suggestion that the electorate will refuse 'to 
take part in democratic governance' because of additional political speech made by a corpo-
ration or any other speaker." (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 296 (citations omitted))). 
69. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An 
Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
69, 77 (2011) (quoting OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE 
CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED MAY 4TH, 1853, To REVISE AND AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETIS 773 (1853) (statement of Edward L. Keyes)). 
70. Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 107, 111 
(201 0) ("This distinction between viewing judges as subconsciously motivated by cultural 
preferences rather than by prejudicial partisan or legal objectives is a crucial one. First, if the 
form of bias in judicial decisionmaking is not properly understood, the judging function is 
unnecessarily delegitimized as being merely a partisan or nonnative exercise. Second, alt-
hough it is impossible to rid judicial decisions of all remnants of bias because of the manner 
in which human cognition operates, social science and legal research indicate that debiasing 
techniques do exist for judges to counteract their susceptibility to the more troubling and 
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We are all reflections of our own experience and despite what is a consider-
able effort by legal educators of ethics to move towards a decrease in un-
conscious bias among lawyers, no judge can completely be made into a tru-
ly impartial entity.71 Nor, truly, do we want them to.72 Some aspect of hu-
manity is expected of the judiciary, to be used within the discretion of wis-
dom and experience, lest we simply replace the legal system with a comput-
er-run justice algorithm and have done with humanity at all.73 
The fact that humanity is imperfect is not sufficient to end the use of 
humans in the justice system. The question that must now urgently be an-
swered is simply at what levels of directness do we wish to allow campaign 
contributions to be a source of influence on judicial decisions. A corollary 
to that inquiry is whether we consider the remedies of the judicial regulatory 
system sufficient to combat the effects of this influence. 
If we accept as a first principle that campaign contributions, direct or 
indirect, affect the behavior of the elected, then we encounter a normative 
question of where that influence is appropriate if it is inescapable. The Citi-
zen's United decision stands for the principle that restricting the abilities of 
corporate actors to fund advertisements beyond the campaign's own control 
is permissible. 74 Thus, whatever effect advertising has on election results 
illiberal aspects of their biased decisionmaking. "); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, 
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 
( 1987) ("[T]he theory of cognitive psychology states that the culture-including, for exam-
ple, the media and an individual's parents, peers, and authority figures-transmits certain 
beliefs and preferences. Because these beliefs are so much a part of the culture, they are not 
experienced as explicit lessons. Instead, they seem part of the individual's rational ordering 
of her perceptions of the world."). 
71. Secunda, supra note 70, at 144 ("This persistent state of affairs only means that 
judges will have to work harder to craft their decisions with appropriate humility and self-
awareness."). 
72. Theodore A. McKee, Judges As Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709, 1724 
(2007) ("I am troubled by the fact that our jurisprudence is shaped by personal beliefs, but I 
am more troubled by pretending that judges can somehow become perfect objective adjudi-
cators at the flip of a switch, or the wearing of a robe."). 
73. !d. at 1716-17 ("From the judicial perspective, the vast majority of these cases 
are fairly clear cut, relatively easy to resolve, and usually involve none of today's hot-button 
issues where personal values may have a greater tendency to affect one's jurisprudence .... 
Moreover, even when cases do involve 'vexing issues of constitutional interpretation' the 
facts and law are often so clear that there is little room for a judge's personal view to impact 
his or her decision. However, I think we should candidly admit that there are other instances 
where there is enough play in the factual or precedential joints to allow personal beliefs to 
affect our adjudication. I do not say that this is a good thing, but I do believe it is unavoida-
ble, and that our jurisprudence will be strengthened by admitting this dynamic rather than 
denying its existence." (quoting Seth Rosenthal, The Jury Snub: A Conservative Form of 
Judicial Activism, SLATE, Dec. 18, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2155723)). 
74. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908-09 (2010). 
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will likely be magnified. 75 While that has its own dangers in the other 
branches of government, the question of the effect of such advertising in 
judicial elections requires an assessment of whether the amplified effect is 
cause for even greater concern in judicial decision making. 
As a threshold matter it thus becomes necessary to inquire if the judge 
is susceptible to the influence of campaign donors or campaign expenditures 
in actual judicial decisions. Intuition would suggest that such influence ex-
ists, but faith in judicial training would suggest that on the bench, such in-
fluence would be disregarded in the active role behavior of the judge. After 
all, judges are all subject to the various Canons that stress such requirements 
as impartiality and lack of bias. 76 
Empirical evidence, however, shows that the Canons are not sufficient 
in the direct campaign contributions context.77 In a remarkable recent arti-
cle, Michael Kang and Joanna Shepherd of Emory University sought to 
answer the critical inquiry underpinning the legitimacy of the judicial elec-
tion model; does the money matterT8 They framed their inquiry thusly: "To 
what degree is financing for judicial campaigns associated with judicial 
decisions favorable to the interests of the sources of that campaign financ-
ing? To put it more bluntly, to what extent does money buy judicial deci-
sions, at least where judges rely on campaign contributions to get elect-
ed?"79 
Their dataset included "detailed information on virtually every state 
supreme court case in all fifty states between 1995 and 1998[,] ... more 
than 28,000 cases, involving more than 470 judges."80 Specifically, they 
focused on campaign contributions from business groups, routinely the sin-
gle largest contributors in state Supreme Court races. 81 The results were 
"provocative."82 They found that "campaign contributions from business 
groups" were positively associated with "judicial votes in favor of business 
interests. "83 
Moreover, "every dollar of contributions from business groups is as-
sociated with increases in the probability that elected judges will decide for 
75. Melody Kramer, 'Citizens United' Ruling Opened Floodgates on Groups' Ad 
Spending, NPR (Oct. 7, 20 I 0) http:/ /www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/20 10/10/07/13039 
9554/fresh-air. 
76. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1-4 (2010). 
77. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: 
The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather Than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 290, 293-96 (2010) (finding that appointed judges write higher quality opin-
ions, whereas elected judges write more opinions~focusing on service to voters). 
78. Kang & Shepherd, supra note 69, at 69. 
79. /d. at 71. 
80. /d. at 72. 
81. /d. at 73. 
82. /d. 
83. /d. 
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business litigants."84 This result was statistically significant only under par-
tisan election schemes, but not under non-partisan ones.85 This is a hopeful 
fact we will reprise later in Section II.C.86 
Interestingly, the relation was evident in judges affiliated with either 
major political party. The study found, "[c]ampaign contributions are pre-
dictive of judicial voting in partisan system, regardless of the judges' party 
affiliations."87 Simply, "both Republican and Democratic judges facing par-
tisan elections are more likely to decide for business litigants than judges in 
other systems."88 
While other empirical research is obviously necessary and we can 
hope further significant study may mitigate the seemingly inescapable in-
dictment of the partisan judicial electoral system, the current findings are 
damning. Again, these studies were done on elections held before Citizens 
United and only looked at direct campaign contributions. Studies on the 
effect of advertising are clearly needed. As the Court noted in Citizens Unit-
ed, "there is only scant evidence that independent expenditures even ingrati-
ate" the elected and that "[i]ngratiation and access, in any event, are not 
corruption."89 To the extent that money does matter in judicial voting as 
described by Kang and Shepherd, there is little reason to hope that no level 
of ingratiation or access is accomplished in response to the advertising cam-
paign.90 This is likely even more true as the costs of judicial campaigns con-
tinue to escalate. 
B. The Remedy of Recusal? A Due Process Concern 
"The fact is that the greatest crimes are caused by excess and not by neces-
sity. "91 
Aristotle (384 BC- 322 BC) 
All those who appear in court, be they litigants or criminal defendants, 
are entitled to an unbiased judge.92 They are entitled to a fair trial.93 This is 
84. /d. 
85. /d. 
86. See infra Section II.C. 
87. Kang & Shepherd, supra note 69, at 75. 
88. /d. 
89. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010). 
90. Kang & Shepherd, supra note 69, at 94 ("[S]everal empirical studies have found 
that the significant differences in competitiveness and spending across election types produce 
different voting behaviors among judges. For example, studies have shown that judges sub-
ject to nonpartisan and partisan reelection are more likely to avoid unpopular voting on polit-
ically salient issues and impose the death penalty."). 
91. POLITICS, ARISTOTLE (350 B.C.E.), available at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/ 
politics.2.two.html. 
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not simply a compelling government interest. It is the Due Process right of 
the litigant, and it is axiomatic to our system of laws.94 It is also unchal-
lenged by the Court in Citizens United. 95 
That the Due Process right to a fair trial and an unbiased judge can be 
abridged through the medium of disproportionate influence via campaign 
expenditures also went unchallenged by the Citizens United Court.96 The 
remedy for such violation, according to the Court, was not, however, to ban 
the "litigant's political speech"-campaign expenditures.97 Rather, in such 
instances the remedy is simply the judge's recusal.98 
The case standing for that proposition (judicial recusal) is the notori-
ous Caperton v. A. T Massey Coal Co.,99 whose holding was affirmed but 
distinguished in Citizens United. 100 In Caperton, the trial jury had found the 
defendant, Massey, liable for $50 million in compensatory and punitive 
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, and tortious inter-
ference with contract relations. 101 Massey appealed. 102 
In the intervening time, the Supreme Court of Appeals in West Virgin-
ia held its elections. 103 Massey's chairman, Don Blankenship, knowing that 
the Supreme Court of Appeals would soon be determining the $50 million 
appeal, chose to support Brent Benjamin's campaign for that bench. 104 
Blankenship complied with the limit on direct contributions to Benjamin's 
92. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009) ("It is axiomat-
ic that '[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process."' (quoting In re 
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955))). 
93. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
94. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (I 975) ("Concededly, a 'fair trial in a fair 
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process."' (quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136)); see 
Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 ("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due pro-
cess. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our sys-
tem of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end 
no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an 
interest in the outcome. That interest cannot be defined with precision. Circumstances and 
relationships must be considered."). 
95. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876,910 (2010). 
96. /d. ("The McConnell record was 'over 100,000 pages' long, ... yet it 'does not 
have any direct examples of votes being exchanged for ... expenditures.' ... This confirms 
Buckley's reasoning that independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance 
of, quid pro quo corruption. In fact, there is only scant evidence that independent expendi-
tures even ingratiate." (citations omitted)). 
97. Id. 
98. /d. 
99. 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256-58 (2009). 
I 00. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910. 
101. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. 
I 02. I d. at 2257-58. 
103. /d. at 2257. 
104. /d. 
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campaign, donating only the maximum allowed $1,000. 105 He would, how-
ever, go on to spend $500,000 in independent expenditures, including tele-
vision and newspaper advertisements as well as donating an additional $2.5 
million to a political organization targeting Benjamin's opponent. 106 
After Benjamin won the judicial election, Caperton moved to disquali-
fy Justice Benjamin because of the conflict caused by Blankenship's cam-
paign involvement. 107 Justice Benjamin denied the motion and later, along 
with the minimum number of additional judges required to form the majori-
ty, reversed the jury verdict against Massey. 108 
Eventually, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to de-
termine if Caperton's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights were vio-
lated by Justice Benjamin's refusal to recuse himself from the Caperton 
appeal, given the level of Blankenship's support of his electoral cam-
paign. 109 The Court held recusal had been required under those circumstanc-
es. 1 10 Particularly, the Court stated that an elected judge must recuse himself 
"when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant 
and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising 
funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the case was pending 
or imminent."111 
Importantly, the vast majority of Blankenship's money went towards 
campaign expenditures, rather than direct campaign contributions. 112 Yet, 
the Court found that, given the totality of the circumstances, "Blankenship's 
campaign contributions ... had a ... disproportionate influence on the elec-
toral outcome. " 1 13 Since only $1,000 of the nearly $3 million spent by 
Blankenship actually went directly to Benjamin's campaign, the Court 
clearly articulated in this case that campaign expenditures have the ability to 
influence elected behavior much in the same way as direct campaign contri-
butions, at least for the purpose of Due Process evaluation. 1 14 
105. !d. 
106. !d. 
I 07. !d. 
I 08. !d. at 2257-58. 
I 09. !d. at 2256-57, 2259. 
II 0. !d. at 2264. 
Ill. /d. at 2263-64. 
112. !d. at 2257 ("Blankenship donated almost $2.5 million to 'And For The Sake Of 
The Kids,' a political organization ... [and] in addition, just over $500,000 on independent 
expenditures-for direct mailings and letters soliciting donations as well as television and 
newspaper advertisements."). 
113. /d. at 2264. 
114. !d. at 2257, 2264-65 ("We find that Blankenship's significant and disproportion-
ate influence-coupled with the temporal relationship between the election and the pending 
case-'offer a possible temptation to the average ... judge to ... lead him not to hold the 
balance nice, clear and true."' (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 
(1986) (citations omitted))). 
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Moreover, the standard requiring Benjamin's recusal was simply that 
of a substantial risk of actual bias, rather than the much stricter requirement 
"that independent expenditures ... lead to, or create the appearance of, quid 
pro quo corruption" required to support a categorical ban on corporate polit-
ical speech. 115 As the Court stated in Citizens United, "Caperton's holding 
was limited to the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant's 
political speech could be banned. " 116 
The Court in Caperton, however, did note that determining when 
campaign expenditures would be sufficient to require the judge's recusal 
would be extraordinarily difficult in the usual course. 117 Moreover, it is like-
ly rare that the actual chairman of the defendant in a case being appealed 
would take so direct and blatant a position in the funding of a potential ju-
rist's campaign. 
When the donor of disproportionately large campaign expenditures 
has a clear personal stake in the pending appeal, the remedy of requiring 
recusal is apparent and relatively easy to apply. If the donor does not have a 
"personal stake," is the risk of actual bias, however, necessarily lessened? 
Not if the findings of Kang and Shepherd are to be believed.118 That study 
clearly stands for the proposition that classes of campaign donors can actu-
ally influence the ruling of judges (both Democrat and Republican) on be-
half of classes of litigants (donors)Y9 While impossible to prove without 
additional research, there is no reason to believe that further study would 
not likewise find that classes of campaign expenditure donors would actual-
ly influence the ruling of judges in favor of those classes of litigants. Yet, 
there is currently no remedy, not even that ofrecusal, that could be applied 
to protect those litigants' Due Process right to a fair trial. 
All recusal standards are risk-based approaches. They tend to support 
the recusal of the judge on due process grounds if the risk is sufficiently 
substantial. 120 It is no surprise, therefore, that as the amount of money being 
115. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010). Due 
process requires "whether, 'under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and hu-
man weakness,' the interest 'poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice 
must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented."' Caper-
ton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). However, 
"[s]tates may choose to 'adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires."' 
!d. at 2267 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. V. White, 536 U.S. 765,794 (2002) (Kenne-
dy, J., concurring)). 
116. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910. 
117. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263 ("The difficulties of inquiring into actual bias, and 
the fact that the inquiry is often a private one, simply underscore the need for objective rules. 
Otherwise there may be no adequate protection against a judge who simply misreads or 
misapprehends the real motives at work in deciding the case."). 
118. Kang & Shepherd, supra note 69, at 128-29. 
119. !d. 
120. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. 
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spent on judicial elections increases, so too does the public's perception that 
the risk of a biased judge increases in tandem. 
C. Communities Negatively Perceive the Effect of Contributions on Judicial 
Elections 
There is a very interesting dichotomy on the public's opinion of judi-
cial elections. When surveyed, the public often expresses its firm belief that 
elected judges are "more likely to be fair and impartial."121 One national 
survey found that 75% of the public believed elected judges were more im-
partial while only 18% chose appointed, and in another survey 76% favored 
judicial elections to only 20% for judicial appointments. 122 
Yet, when Chief Justice Moyer of the Ohio Supreme Court established 
the Citizens Committee on Judicial Elections in order to review Ohio's judi-
cial election system, 123 the Committee shockingly found that nine out of ten 
Ohioans believed that judges are affected by political contributions and that 
they question the impartiality of judges towards campaign contributors. 124 
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court appointed a Special 
Commission to determine whether the state of judicial elections across the 
state diminished the public's perception of the judiciary .125 After several 
public hearings, polls, and meetings with interested parties, the Special 
Commission concluded that: 88% of Pennsylvanians believed that judges' 
decisions were influenced, at least some of the time, by campaign contribu-
tions; 75% believed that those who can afford large contributions have more 
121. Ruth V. McGregor, Rule of Law in Challenging Times, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. 
REV. 549, 553 (2009); see J. Christopher Heagarty, Public Opinion and an Elected Judici-
ary: New Avenues for Reform, 39 WILLAMETIE L. REv. 1287, 1292 (2003). 
122. Heagarty, supra note 121, at 1300. 
123. Richard B. McQuade, Report of the Citizens' Committee on Judicial Elections 
(1995), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh!pages/frontline/shows/justice/que/studies. 
html#oh (last visited June 5, 2011). 
124. !d. (providing the Committee's proposal that there must be the following: a limit 
to campaign contribution of $500 from individuals and $2,500 from organizations ($5,000 
for Supreme Court candidates); candidates' speech must be limited; recusal for judges in 
cases where attorneys or parties made a significant campaign contribution; limitations on 
contribution periods; and increased disclosure requirements (identification of each donor and 
full disclosure twenty days before an election). The Committee set out its responsibility with 
the assumptions that a majority of the committee would not be comprised of lawyers and 
that, unlike other politicians, judges are held to a higher standard. The report was based on 
work performed from several hearings, commissioned public opinion polls, and, meetings 
with experts and interested parties). 
125. LAKE, SOSIN, SNELL, PERRY & ASSOCS., INC., PENNSYLVANIA SPECIAL 
COMMISSION TO LIMIT CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES 4, 6 (1998), available at 
http://www. pacourts. us/NR/rdonlyres/7 5F3607E-BOB4-4B9B-95 54-
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influence in electing judges; and, Pennsylvanians are more anxious about 
the judiciary than about other elected offices. 126 
This divergence in opinion could well be summed up with the view 
that the public thinks that elected judges are more independent than ap-
pointed ones, except when it comes to their contributors. It suggests the 
public perceives and the empirical evidence supports that the judges stay 
bought. The corollary is that the public appears to believe that those ap-
pointed are corrupt or at least biased by the political appointment system 
itself, despite the lack of any supporting evidence. Since the appointment 
process is beyond the public's control or understanding, there is a general 
mistrust of it and those that profit from it, namely, the judges themselves. 
Also, it is possible that the simple availability of having elections comforts 
the public; in the sense they believe that corrective action is possible. 
It is likely impossible to create a system where the public feels that the 
judiciary is truly impartial and fair as both options generally require that 
political parties be involved in the selection process in some way. The evi-
dence from the Kang article that the correlation in rulings to judicial action 
disappears in non-partisan elections suggests that the public may, in fact, be 
intuitively correct at some level. It is the presence of party officers or offi-
cials that is the actual problematic source of bias. 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Supreme Court previously recognized in Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White that there exists a "'fundamental tension between the 
ideal character of the judicial office and the real world of electoral poli-
tics. "'127 Despite this, last year's Supreme Court reached a provocative deci-
sian in Citizens United, allowing for a remarkable expansion in funding 
avenues for political speech. 
Citizens United was the product of a "decades-long legal drive" to re-
think limitations on political speech doctrine. Much of the original inspira-
tion drew "from the 1971 memo drafted by soon-to-be Justice Lewis Powell 
that urged corporate leaders to fund scholars and public interest legal groups 
to promote a 'free market' approach in the courts."128 Former Federal Elec-
tion Commission chair Bradley Smith bragged to the New York Times that 
126. See id. at 7. 
127. 536 U.S. 765, 821 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 
501 U.S. 380,400 (1991)). 
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FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/money 
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Citizens United was the fruit of "long-term ideological warfare."129 This 
effort was bold, strategic, and willing to rethink basic premises. It has been 
markedly effective. Above all, it sought to advance a powerful but narrow 
notion of the First Amendment, focused on the rights of the speaker, espe-
cially corporate speakers. 
The potential impact of this decision on judicial elections has not gone 
without notice. As one author wrote, the potential for such advertising to 
further corrode the public faith in the judiciary is clear: 
While corporate and union big money may or may not be ideal for elections of leg-
islative and executive offices, it poses even greater risk for judicial elections. In his 
dissent, Justice Stevens cites the Justice At Stake amicus brief, joined by AJS. He 
writes "'the majority of the States select their judges through popular elections. At 
a time when concerns about the conduct of judicial elections have reached a fever 
pitch, the Court today unleashes the floodgates of corporate and union general 
treasury spending in these races."' More money injected into judicial races threat-
ens to undermine both the actual and perceived impartiality of the judiciary.130 
Thus, the question becomes simply, if we acknowledge that increased 
advertising spending in judicial elections will only increase the public per-
ception of bias by the judiciary, how can we allow judicial selection by 
election? The answer is that we cannot. The role of the judge requires im-
partiality and our system of laws requires lack of partisanship in judicial 
decision-making. The answer seems to be fundamentally clear, neither cam-
paign finance laws nor the self-regulation of the judiciary can restrain the 
impartial judge from acting like the politician. In a system allowing for no 
restraint on speech, the only option is silence. 
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